Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Of Straps and Strip Cells by Vincent C. Alexander & Neil A. Nowick
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 19 
Number 3 Volume 19, Summer 1973, Number 3 Article 3 
March 2017 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Of Straps and Strip Cells 
Vincent C. Alexander 
Neil A. Nowick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vincent C. Alexander and Neil A. Nowick (1973) "Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Of Straps and Strip 
Cells," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 19 : No. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol19/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 




Chief Justice Warren Burger has announced' that Americans have
three options available to them in combatting the high "recall" rates of
the prisons: (1) extended sentences, resulting in a policy of "lock them up
and throw the keys away"; (2) massive police protection approximating the
conditions of martial law; or (3) a concentrated effort to improve the pro-
grams and the facilities of the institutions charged with confinement of
convicted criminals. 2 The Chief Justice heartily endorses the third alterna-
tive, finding it "the only one compatible with our American tradition. '3
The violent outbreak at Attica 4 and its progeny5 made it clear, in a
most unfortunate way, that there are serious problems6 in the state penal
systems. One of these problems is the brutal and psychologically damaging
treatment being administered to prisoners under the cloak of prison secu-
rity and discipline. Since criminals are often psychologically disturbed
individuals,7 a policy of excessively harsh and abusive treatment in the
prisons only serves to exacerbate the situation by fostering rebellion and
*This article is a student work prepared by Vincent C. Alexander and Neil A. Nowick,
members of the ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Re-
search.
I Burger, Our Options are Limited, 18 VILL. L. REV. 165 (1972) (paper presented at the 1972
Annual Dinner of the National Conference of Christians and Jews held in Philadelphia on
November 16, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Burger].
Id. at 167-68, 172.
Id. at 172.
'Inmate rioting broke out at the Attica Correctional Facility in New York on September 9,
1971. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
The recovery of control by the authorities on September 13 has been described as "the
bloodiest one-day encounter between Americans since the Civil War," the Indian massacres
of the nineteenth century excepted. Wilbanks, The Report of the Commission on Attica, 37
FED. PROB. 3 (1973).
1 Rioting erupted at the Oklahoma state prison at McAlester, resulting in at least two deaths
and 50 injuries. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1973, at 36, col. 3 (city ed.). Although correctional
authorities were unable to offer any particular reasons for the revolt, prisoners attributed it
to the prison policy of treating inmates "like victims of a tribal system" or "like animals."
Id. at col. 2, 3. See note 298 infra.
For a bibliography of recent writings analyzing the prison problem, see Miller, The Lawyer's
Hang-Up: Due Process versus the Real Issue, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 197, 203 n.25 (1972).
1 See Burger, supra note 1, at 169.
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despair.8 Fortunately, neither mute endurance nor uprisings like those at
Attica are the only available alternatives; many prisoners are taking their
grievances to the courts and seeking redress by asserting their constitu-
tional rights. As a result, courts are becoming active participants in effect-
ing the prison reform' that the Chief Justice finds so urgently in demand.
Courts have consciously shunned this role in the past, preferring to
leave such matters in the hands of prison officials' and legislators." But
today, in meeting their traditional obligations to protect constitutional
rights,'" the courts are aiding prison reform by insisting that inmates re-
ceive the decent and humane treatment to which they are entitled.' How-
ever, judicial determinations that particular prison practices and condi-
tions amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment' 4 have been made on a case-by-case basis and are deliberately
narrow rulings.
To be sure, eighth amendment guarantees are not the only federal civil
rights being denied prisoners in state penal systems today. Claims based
on the first' 5 and the fourteenth"8 amendments are also the subject of much
See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. In
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966), the court found a direct relation
between harsh treatment and a rebellious spirit:
[Tihe type of [solitary] confinement depicted in . .. the inmates' testimony results
in a slow-burning fire of resentment on the part of the inmates until it finally explodes
in open revolt ....
Id. at 680.
' See Kaufman, Prison: The Judge's Dilemma, 41 FORD. L. REv. 495, 511 (1973) (article
presented by Judge Kaufman, now Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, at the Third Annual John F. Sonnett Lecture held at the Fordham Law
School on November 20, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Kaufman]. Both Judge Kaufman and
Chief Justice Burger have noted that the primary thrust of the litigation affecting criminals'
rights during the sixties was on the constitutional guarantees provided to the accused from
the moment of his arrest to the imposition of the sentence. Compare Id. at 496 with Burger,
supra note 1, at 166-67.
" See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
Cf. Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972). See
Kaufman, supra note 9, at 504, 510-15.
,1 It is when other agencies of the government have failed to protect constitutional rights that
the courts should be summoned into action. See, e.g., Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674
(N.D. Cal. 1966). See generally Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 175, 191 (1970).
,3 Kaufman, supra note 9, at 509-10.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states: "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
'1 See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (prisoner to be given reasonable
opportunity of pursuing his Buddhist faith); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.
1972) (prisoner's right to attend Sunday Mass not absolute when prison discipline and secu-
rity are at stake).
6 See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971) (minimum due process
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litigation. Regardless of whether the eighth amendment will ultimately
prove the most effective tool for reforming the prisons, it should at least
ameliorate the overly severe and inhumane procedures and conditions ex-
isting in many of our nation's correctional institutions.
Judicial Reluctance to Intervene on Behalf of Prisoners: The "Hands-
Off" Doctrine
Although a number of remedies previously existed for the enforcement
of prisoners' rights,'7 federal courts of the 1950's and early 1960's remained
unwilling to entertain state prisoners' suits. Expressing a fear that judicial
review would lead to judicial administration of the prisons,'" courts have
adhered to a "hands-off' policy, 9 and have refused to listen to the com-
standards required before disciplinary punishments may be imposed). One comment has
suggested that fourteenth amendment due process may be a more viable means of achieving
decent treatment for prisoners than the eighth amendment. Hirschkop & Millemann, The
Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795, 821 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hirsch-
kop & Millemann].
" Habeas corpus is an adequate remedy if the underlying legality of the confinement is being
challenged, but, use of the "Great Writ" requires the exhaustion of state remedies before the
federal courts will entertain the petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971). But see Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam). A more viable vehicle is section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971). In a section 1983 action, the prisoner is not limited to an attack on
the legality of his imprisonment. He may seek damages and/or an injunction challenging the
behavioral constraints allegedly depriving him of his civil rights. See, e.g., Landman v.
Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973) (damages). Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971) (injunction). See generally Jacob, Prison Discipline & Inmate Rights, 5
HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 227, 250-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jacob]; Note,
Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270 (1969). Federal prisoners can sue
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries caused by the negligence of prison officials;
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1973).
For a detailed account of the prisoner's lawsuit, from the decision as to choice of theory
to the methods of insuring enforcement of the final court order, see Hirschkop, Crisman, &
Millemann, Litigating an Affirmative Prisoners' Rights Action, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 39
(1972).
" See Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951) ("it is not the function of the
courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries"); Powell v.
Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949) ("the court has no power to interfere with the
conduct of the prison or its discipline"); Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 706, 707 (M.D.
Pa. 1949) ("nor is it within the province of the courts to superintend the treatment of prisoners
in penitentiaries, or interfere with the conduct of prisons or their discipline").
" The phrase is from FRrrCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INMATEs 31 (1961) (document
prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons). For the origin and early effect of the "hands-
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plaints of prisoners except when "extreme" or "gross" deprivations of con-
stitutional rights were alleged.20 The response usually given was that courts
were "without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with
the ordinary prison rules or regulations.""
The "hands-off" doctrine, more a judicial attitude than a rule of law,22
is not without its rationale. The primary justification for this attitude is
that the separation of powers demands judicial non-interference in prison
affairs2 3 because the prison system is under the jurisdiction of the executive
branch of the government and not the district courts." Interwoven with the
doctrine of separation is the argument that judges lack the expertise to
determine which rules and regulations are necessary for the preservation
of prison discipline and security.2" Therefore, a presumption of legality
necessarily attaches to the decision of prison administrators. 6 Lawfully
convicted criminals who are subject to imprisonment must forfeit a num-
ber of rights and privileges," liberty being the foremost among them. Incar-
off" doctrine see Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 n.4 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Beyond the
Ken].
"I LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir. 1972) (Moore, J., dissenting); Childs v.
Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1963); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.
1955). See Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
985, 986-87 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Rights of Prisoners].
1I Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
2 In adhering to the "hands-off" doctrine, a justice of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recently declared:
[P]rison officials are experienced in such matters [of an administrative nature] and
familiar with all the facts and circumstances surrounding any particular incident. I
believe this makes them much better able to make judgments as to the proper type
and duration of disciplinary measures than judges ensconced in the quietude of a
Federal Courthouse. In short, the Warden . . .does not presume to tell us how to solve
our problems; I do not think that we are qualified to solve his.
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir. 1972).
1 United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1965); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d
330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497, 499 (S.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 439
F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
z Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949).
25 See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
26 See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 643 (E.D. Va. 1971); Note, Decency and
Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841, 847-48 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Decency and Fairness].
27 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
The hands-off doctrine operates reasonably to the extent that it prevents judicial
review of deprivations which are necessary or reasonable concomitants of imprison-
ment.
Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir. 1966). Some of the deprivations commonly
associated with imprisonment include the right of privacy, association, travel, and choice of
occupation. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 643 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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ceration requires extensive controls, and correctional directors have been
duly charged with the maintenance of these controls. Since they are on the
scene daily, prison officials, in a practical sense, are in a better position
than judges to make correct decisions concerning disruptive prisoners. The
problem for the judiciary, of course, is the constitutional legitimacy of
some of the means used by administrators to enforce discipline. Courts of
the past, however, expressed few compunctions in deferring to administra-
tors' judgments concerning the legality of procedures in the penitentia-
ries.28
Finally, considerations of time and efficiency help explain the tenacity
of the "hands-off" position. As one federal district court judge recently
expressed it:
If each [prison official's decision] is to be subject for federal examination of
a plenary sort, the energy and time of the federal judiciary and of state penal
officials would be diverted to an inordinate extent.29
The reasons supporting judicial self-restraint in prison matters are not
totally devoid of merit. Nevertheless, they are subject to persuasive
counter-arguments. 0 By refusing to review complaints, courts leave prison-
ers solely in the custody of guards and administrative officials without
satisfactory assurance that constitutional rights will be protected. Despite
the separation of powers, courts have an affirmative duty to insure the
enforcement of constitutional guarantees, especially where another branch
of the government has shirked such responsibility . 3 In answer to the asser-
tion that judges should not become involved in prison affairs because they
lack administrative know-how, it has been pointed out that judges are
neither financial wizards nor transportation specialists, yet they contin-
21 For a federal court ... to place a punishment beyond the power of a state to impose
on an inmate is a drastic interference with the state's free political and administrative
processes. It is not only that we, trained as judges, lack expertise in prison administra-
tion. Even a lifetime of study in prison administration ... would not qualify us as a
federal court to command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided is
suitable because to us the choice may seem unsound or personally repugnant.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971) (emphasis in original). The error in such
reasoning is that the court, as a consequence, shirks its responsibility in determining which
administrative processes are unconstitutional, leaving the judgment of legality to administra-
tors alone.
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 644 (E.D. Va. 1971). See also Krist v. Smith, 309
F. Supp. 497, 500 (S.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
See generally Beyond the Ken, supra note 19, at 515.
' In 1962 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared:
[A] mere grant of authority cannot be taken as a blanket waiver of responsibility in
its execution. Numerous federal agencies are vested with extensive administrative
responsibilities. But it does follow that their actions are immune from judicial review.
Maniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). See also
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 646 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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ually review decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate
Commerce Commission12 Few courts have openly expressed the argument
that review of prisoners' complaints should be restrained in order to pre-
vent an overburdened court calendar. Although relaxation of the hands-
off doctrine may result in a greater number of prisoners' complaints, when
the grievance is not frivolous,n a court "cannot flinch from [its] clear
responsibility to protect rights secured by the Federal Constitution. '34
Until recently, various formulations of the hands-off philosophy were
uttered time and again in dismissing prisoners' complaints, and only when
the petitioner could show "extreme" deprivation of rights would the courts
intervene.35 But "extreme" circumstances have begun to appear with in-
creasing frequency in the federal courts, 3 signifying, perhaps, a growing
acceptance that even though prison administrators may legitimately de-
prive the prisoner of many of the freedoms associated with life outside the
prison walls, 37 they are not entitled to deprive him of all fundamental
constitutional rights. Earlier declarations that courts were "without
power" to intervene 38 have given way to the more frequent statement that
courts may be "reluctant to interfere with the internal operation and ad-
ministration of a prison, ' 39 but they will not hesitate "to entertain
petitions asserting violations of fundamental rights and, where indicated,
to grant relief. '40
Recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court have reflected this
change in attitude. Johnson v. Avery, 4" decided in 1969, followed the trend,
in form and content, of many federal court decisions during the sixties:
There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention facili-
ties are state functions. They are subject to federal authority only where
paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights supervene.' 2
In Johnson, the Court found such a supervening right: the availability and
preparation of the writ of habeas corpus.43 The Court had little difficulty
in condemning the policy of suppressing "writ-writers," prisoners who aid
" See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742, 743 (1969);
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 83. A means of overcoming the lack of expertise is
provided by referring to outside sources. See text accompanying notes 274-77 infra.
" The problem of frivolous claims is discussed in Kaufman, supra note 9, at 505.
" Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1967).
" See note 20 supra.
", For a survey of recent court activity in the area of eighth amendment and due process
abuses in the prisons see Decency and Fairness, supra note 26.
" See note 27 supra.
" See text accompanying note 21 supra.
' Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 893 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
I" Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968).
393 U.S. 483 (1969).
,2 Id. at 486.
Id. at 489.
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fellow inmates in the preparation of writs."
Three years later, in Cruz v. Beto," the Court was asked to decide the
merits 46 of an alleged violation of a prisoner's first amendment rights. The
Court found "palpable discrimination" if a Buddhist prisoner could sus-
tain his allegations that he had been denied the reasonable opportunity of
pursuing his faith.47 The opening statement of the decision should set the
standard for federal review of prisoners' grievances in the seventies:
Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitutional
rights of all "persons," which include prisoners. We are not unmindful that
prison officials must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison
affairs, and that prisoners necessarily are subject to appropriate rules and
regulations. But persons in prison, like other individuals, have the right to
petition the Government for redress of grievances . . .8
In viewing prisoners as persons with enforceable constitutional rights,
the Supreme Court adopted the position, expressed in an earlier federal
case,49 that prisoners retain "all the rights of ordinary citizen[s] except
those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from [them] . . .by
law. ' 50 In order to insure that these rights are guarded, courts must inter-
vene in prison life.' Courts need no longer pay lip-service to the hands-off
doctrine and then proceed to find "extreme" circumstances as a means of
providing relief. In the future, federal judges should avoid the unsound
policy of finding exceptions to a rule which has lost its precedential value.
Cruz v. Beto has abrogated the hands-off doctrine with a clear-cut state-
ment that prisoners' constitutional rights must be enforced.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Prisons
Prisoners seeking relief on the theory that the treatment they are
receiving is in violation of the eighth amendment may face an obstacle as
equally frustrating as the earlier hands-off attitude of the courts. For years,
courts have struggled with the meaning of the phrase "cruel and unusual
11 Id. at 490.
405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
" In Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) the Supreme Court refused to express any views
on the merits of the petitioner's claim, but did insist that the prisoner have his day in court.
1 405 U.S. at 322.
,1 Id. at 321.
" Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
Id. at 445. This view is a radical departure from that of the nineteenth century, when the
common opinion was that "[the prisoner] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only
forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity
accords to him." Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 1024, 1026, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871).
11 When a man possesses a substantial right, the courts will be diligent in finding a
way to protect it.
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
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punishments," and still have not arrived at a concrete definition." Perhaps
a subsconscious reason for the vitality of the hands-off doctrine in eighth
amendment cases has been the difficulty encountered by judges in formu-
lating a test to measure cruelty and unusualness. Although the Supreme
Court has considered the eighth amendment in a variety of fact situa-
tions,O all of the cases have dealt with specific sentences for crimes. The
Court has never dealt with the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the
context of prison disciplinary practices" or general facilities. Hence, lower
federal courts have been compelled to evaluate claims of prison abuses
guided only by unrelated and frequently obtuse explanations of the eighth
amendment's language. Courts have made it clear, however, that the pros-
cription of the clause is not confined to statutorily imposed sentences.5 5
The treatment a prisoner receives at the hands of his keepers is subject to
eighth amendment review" as surely as if it had been explicitly ordered
by legislative fiat.
A comparison of current prison practices with historical punishments
thought to be within the eighth amendment's ban57 is a fruitless means of
." See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86. 99 (1958) ("the exact scope of the constitutional
phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by th[e] Court"); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) ("difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent
of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not
be inflicted"); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1971) (the eighth amendment's
"precise boundaries are still unclear"); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 893 (N.D. Miss.
1972) ("it is established that the Eighth Amendment does not have a fixed and settled
connotation").
'3 See text accompanying notes 64-73 infra.
' The sentence under the Court's consideration in Weems .v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910), 12 to 20 years at hard and painful labor, the constant wearing of a chain fastened at
the ankle and wrist is nearest in substance to the type of situation prisoners may encounter
in confinement.
' Neither do we wish to draw .. .any meaningful distinction between punishment
by way of sentence statutorily prescribed and punishment imposed for prison discipli-
nary purposes. It seems to us that the Eighth Amendment's proscription has applica-
tion to both.
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580-81 (8th Cir. 1968) (opinion of then Circuit Judge Black-
mun).
5 Id.; LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F.
Supp. 278, 280 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Landman v.Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
51 The framers of the eighth amendment to the Constitution were not the first to use the
phrase cruel and unusual punishment. King John had banned excessive fines in the Magna
Charta and the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 had declared that excessive bail ought
not to be required nor "excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, preamble, cl. 10 (1689), quoted in Comment, Furman v. Geor-
gia-Deathknell for Capital Punishment?, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 107, 110 n.29 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Deathknell for Capital Punishment]. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100 (1958). Use of that phrase in the 1689 document was to prevent a recurrence of the tortures
and barbarous punishment which prevailed during the reign of the Stuarts. Wright v.
McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
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determining constitutionality. Among the punishments first recognized to
be within the purview of the eighth amendment were pillorying, disembow-
eling, decapitation, 5 burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the
wheel,59 the rack and thumbscrew,10 and other tortures involving a linger-
ing death.' Some courts held that these were the only practices intended
to fall under the eighth amendment's prohibition.2 Virtually all modern
punishments would be adjudged constitutonal3 under this standard.
It was not until the Supreme Court's decision in Weems v. United
States4 that the futility of making historical comparisons was fully real-
ized. The Court declared that "a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."65 Instead of look-
ing at the eighth amendment only as a guard against the repetition of
history,"8 its meaning should be viewed in a progressive light, so that it
"may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a hu-
mane justice. 67 This idea was further refined in Trop v. Dulles8 which
declared that the eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing so-
ciety." 9 Particularly noteworthy was Chief Justice Warren's statement
that the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man." 0 Robinson v. California" is important in the
context of state prison reform primarily for its application of the eighth
amendment to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment." In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas announced that
"[tihe Eighth Amendment expresses the revulsion of civilized man
against barbarous acts-the 'cry of horror' against man's inhumanity to his
fellow man. '"13
Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969); Deathknell for
Capital Punishment, supra at 108-09.
"' Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389-400 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
' In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
EU Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962).
' Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
6 See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 409-10, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893).
3 Id.
"U 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The importance of the Weems decision as a precedent for prison reform
is minimized in Rubin, The Burger Court and the Penal System, 8 CraIM. L. BULL. 31, 33
(1972).
'5 217 U.S. at 373.
61 Id.
67 Id.
" 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
" Id. at 101.
71 Id. at 100.
" 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
72 Id.; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963).
71 370 U.S. at 676.
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The attitudes expressed in Weems, Trop, and Robinson have pro-
duced at least one standard,7" albeit a protean one, for judging the consti-
tutionality of punishments. Although phrased in a variety of ways, the
standard is commonly known as the "shock the conscience" test.7 5 If a
punishment offends "civilized standards of humane decency"7 6 or is
"shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people,"" it is repug-
nant to the Constitution."
From dissenting and concurring opinions in other Supreme Court
cases, two other tests for measuring cruelty and unusualness have
emerged.' The first is an "excessiveness" test. If the punishment is greatly
disproportionate to the offense charged, if it doesn't "fit the crime,"8 it
falls within the constitutional proscription.8
A second alternative to the "shock the conscience" standard questions
whether the punishment is "necessary," i.e., whether "the permissible
aims of punishment (e.g., deterrence, isolation, rehabilitation) [can] be
achieved as effectively" by a less severe punishment." Under the "unnec-
essary cruelty" test, 3 a punishment is unconstitutional notwithstanding
71 In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the Court declared the death
penalty unconstitutional in the specific instances under consideration, but did little to en-
large upon the interpretations given the eighth amendment in prior cases. Each of the nine
Justices wrote a separate opinion, and the majority was unable to agree upon a single theory
as to why capital punishment was cruel and unusual. However, one view shared by at least
three of the Justices was that the primary evil of the death penalty is not its inherent cruelty,
but rather the discretionary and arbitrary manner in which executions have been sanctioned.
Id. at 242, 309, 310. See Deathknell for Capital Punishment, supra note 57, at 143.
11 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 473 (1947). (Burton J.,
dissenting) ("Shocks the most fundamental instincts of civilized men"); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 375 (1910) ("shock the sensibilities of men"); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d
970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965) ("admeasurements made by general conscience"); Carey v. Settle,
351 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1965) ("of such character or consequence as to shock general
conscience").
76 Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967).
17 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
" The Court that decided Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), utilized the "shock the
conscience" standard to test whether government agents had abridged due process in acquir-
ing evidence. Justice Frankfurter wrote that "the proceedings by which th[el conviction was
obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
.... This is conduct that shocks the conscience . . . . They are methods too close to the
rack and the screw to permit of constitutonal differentiation." Id. at 172.
7" Their existence was noted by Justice Goldberg in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in
Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 364 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
It is against the excessive severity of the punishment, as applied to the offenses for
which it is inflicted, that the inhibition is directed.
See also Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 409-10, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893).
" Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
82 Id.
1: Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), had held that the eighth amendment forbids pun-
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that it is imposed in pursuit of a legitimate penological goal if it goes
beyond what is necessary to achieve that goal."
Each of the tests has been used, either alone or in combination with
one another to condemn procedures and conditions in the prisons. Al-
though the "shock the conscience" test has been most often applied, it has
received the greatest criticism. Whose conscience is to be the guide-that
of the judge, or that of the collective community?15 Hopefully, they will
coincide. One objective method which judges have relied upon in gauging
the attitudes of the "maturing society" is a comparative law process.86 In
adjudging the acceptability of a punishment, the court looks to the laws
of other jurisdictions, both within and without the United States 7 to see
whether or not similar practices are generally accepted. This approach is
problematical in the prison context since there are few legislative state-
ments, the traditional indicators of public sentiment, dealing with specific
punishments in the provisions. Statutory delegations of authority to prison
officials are intentionally general in order to provide for flexible adminis-
tration .8
Although a more analytical device, the "excessiveness" test suffers
from its narrow applicability. Since this line of inquiry considers whether
a punishment is disproportionate to a particular offense,"9 it is not parti-
cularly useful as a means of eliminating widespread prison practices unless
they are found to be out of proportion to all offenses. 0 Moreover, prison
administrators in day to day contact with inmates are given wide latitude
in disciplinary matters. Administrative judgments are ordinarily pre-
ishments of torture "and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty." Id. at 136.
" See Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
'" Justice Powell, dissenting in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), warned that judicial
self-restraint is necessary in order to prevent judges from reading their personal preferences
into the Constitution under the rubric of universally held "standards of decency." Id. at 431.
See note 28 supra.
1 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
The comparisons to be made under this procedure should not be those of historical usage,
i.e., comparing the severity of current punishments with those of history. See text accompa-
nying notes 57-63 supra.
'7 A comparison of Phillipine and American punishments for the same crime aided the Court
in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910). In Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968), the court determined the adversity of public opinion by observing that "only two
states still permit the use of the strap." Id. at 580. Other punishments in the prisons, such
as solitary confinement, have been upheld because of their use "in almost every jurisdiction
in the country." Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1971). See Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 192, 193 n.22 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
" See, e.g., N.Y. CORR. LAW § 137(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972):
The commissioner shall provide for such measures as he may deem necessary or appro-
priate for the safety, security and control of correctional facilities and the maintenance
of order therein.
" See, e.g., Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
" Cf. id. at 1025.
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sumed valid.9 It is extremely difficult to overcome this presumption unless
the court shifts the burden of proof or finds that a penalty is invalid per
se. 
92
The necessity of a punishment has only recently been recognized as a
criteria of its constitutionality93 in cases of alleged prison abuses. This
approach places the burden of justification on the executioner of the pun-
ishment. 94 Because of their hands-off attitude, courts in the past did not
find it proper to put prison administrators to the task of demonstrating
that security and discipline could not be achieved by less severe means.
In relaxing the hands-off doctrine, however, courts have been more willing
to question whether allegedly cruel means of maintaining order are ac-
tually necessary. 95 The availability of objective studies by penologists and
criminologists on the necessity of certain disciplinary devices" makes the
judge's investigation under this standard less burdensome.
Clearly, the courts have not been blessed with a watertight means of
reviewing prison treatment alleged to be in violation of the eighth amend-
ment. Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing as a circuit judge for the Eighth
Circuit, summarized the current status of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause as follows:
[S]o far as the Supreme Court cases are concerned, we have a flat recogni-
tion that the limits of the Eighth Amendment's proscription are not easily
or exactly defined, and we also have clear indications that the applicable
standards are flexible, that disproportion, both among punishments and be-
tween punishment and crime, is a factor to be considered, and that broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and de-
cency are useful and usable.97
One would be hard-pressed to find a more concise statement of the general
guidelines to be followed..
" See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
" See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1972).
1 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 340 F. Supp. 881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 792 (M.D. Tenn.
1969).
" See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968); Landman v. Royster, 333
F. Supp. 621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 789, 792 (M.D. Tenn.
1969).
Although ultimately denying relief to a prisoner who complained of prolonged solitary
confinement without physical activity, the court in Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.
Ga. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971), requested an explanation of policy from the
prison administrators:
While the Board of Corrections is not a formal party to this litigation it may be willing
to inquire into the reasons and inform the Court why it is impractical for maximum
security prisoners to be taken out of their cells periodically for the purpose of exercise.
309 F. Supp. at 501.
" See text accompanying notes 274-77 infra.
17 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
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In view of significant recent decisions affecting all forms of prison
security measures, courts of the future may have fewer difficulties than
their predecessors in attaching meaning to the eighth amendment. Federal
courts have handed down an impressive number of precedents, making it
increasingly clear which procedures and conditions constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. The legality of the major prison disciplinary devices
and living conditions will now be measured against those decisions. From
such an examination, it may be possible to discern not only which prison
abuses are destined for extinction, but also the means by which they will
be banished from penal systems.
Disciplinary Procedures
Few would deny the necessity for rules and regulations governing con-
duct in prison. The occupants of such an institution must be expected to
conform to minimal standards of orderly behavior, and disciplinary devices
are needed to attain and enforce the desired conformity. At issue, of course,
is whether some of the methods of enforcement are so harsh as to come into
conflict with the Constitution.
A. Whipping and Physical Force
Since a permanent injunction ended the use of whipping in the Arkan-
sas penal system," only Mississippi has continued to permit official use of
"the strap" as a prison disciplinary device.9 When petitioned by inmates
of the Mississippi State Penitentiary, the court in Gates v. Collier'0 en-
joined corporal punishment "of such severity as to offend present-day con-
cepts of decency and human dignity" ' but found itself without power to
enjoin the use of whipping in all circumstances. 02 To issue such an injunc-
tion would have required the convening of a three-judge panel' 3 since the
' Id. at 580-81.
" MISS. CODE ANNOT. § 7968 (Supp. 1972). Note, however, that Delaware statutes, provide
for a specified number of "lashings" as part of the sentence for certain crimes. See, e.g., 11
DEL. CODE ANNOT. § 631 (Supp. 1970) (20 lashes allowed for grand larceny). Such lashings
are to be inflicted publicly, on the bare back, with strokes "well laid on." 11 DEL. CODE
ANNOT. § 3908 (1953).
349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
,o Id. at 899-900.
12 Id. at 895.
'°' See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1971). The jurisdictional problem did not face the court in Jackson
v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); whipping was condemnable in Arkansas because (1)
a three-judge court decided the case; and (2)the Arkansas statute had not expressly named
whipping as a permissible punishment. See ARK. STAT. ANNor. § 46-158 (1964). The statute
merely permitted the state penitentiary board to "prescribe the mode and extent of punish-
ments." Indeed, the statute was so lacking in guidelines that a court later declared it "an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power." State v. Bruton, 246 Ark. 288, 290, 437
S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (1969).
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punishment was expressly authorized by a state statute. The court found
some consolation in the fact that the Mississippi statute authorizing whip-
ping forbids its use except upon express written order of the superintend-
ent, limits the number of licks to seven, and generally discourages the use
of corporal punishment.10 4 Further, it was found that the lash had not been
used at a penitentiary since 1965.105
Although falling short of declaring whipping unconstitutional, the
decision in Gates v. Collier casts serious doubt upon the continued use of
whipping as a legitimate means of punishment. Whipping had been re-
stricted in Arkansas when a district court imposed strict procedural re-
quirements as a condition precedent to using the strap.106 It was later
found, however, that these controls were being ignored, and in Jackson v.
Bishop,107 the court restrained its use altogether, holding that:
[T]he use of the strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment
which, in this last third of the 20th century runs afoul of the Eighth Amend-
ment; . . . the strap's use, irrespective of any precautionary conditions
which may be imposed, offends contemporary concepts of decency and
human dignity and precepts of civilization which we profess to pos-
sess. .. .. 18
While the Jackson court relied principally on a "shock the conscience"
test, it further denied that the state "needed" this tool for disciplinary
purposes 09 merely because the prison lacked a sufficient number of solitary
confinement units.110
Whipping has not always enjoyed the apparent general disfavor", that
one might expect. When the federal court system was first established,"'
"whipping was classed with moderate fines and short terms of imprison-
ment" for purposes of determining district court jurisdiction over criminal
cases.1 13 Whipping was considered to be not only a legitimate form of pun-
ishment but also a relatively mild one, "thirty stripes" being the norm.,1 4
By 1885, however, the Supreme Court noted that "at the present day...
whipping might be thought an infamous punishment" ' and by the 1950's
,0 349 F. Supp. at 895.
Id.
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 689 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
.7 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
"' Id. at 579.
", Id. at 580.
Id. at 575.
See id.
12 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-7.
See Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428 (1885).
114 Id.
"I Id. "Infamous punishment" was used by the Court in this case not within the context of
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment but as a means for determining
the necessity of a grand jury indictment for "infamous crime." Id. at 429.
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a majority of states had taken legislative action to strike its use."' How-
ever, not all modern courts have been prepared to deny the states the right
to use whipping as a form of punishment. In 1963 the Supreme Court of
Delaware refused to declare whipping unconstitutonal, holding that a de-
termination of its legality should be left to legislative bodies through which
society expresses what is "cruel by contemporary standards.""'
Gates v. Collier,"' while not a precedent for holding whipping uncon-
stitutional, along with Jackson v. Bishop,' 9 provides a strong indication
that the strap is destined for future criticism where federal courts discover
its use.
Beatings by guards and other prison personnel are not impermissible
per se for the simple reason that force may be necessary for self-defense or
for suppression of riots.' 0 However, when beatings continue beyond the
bounds of necessity or are administered for unjustifiable reasons, they
provide grounds for judicial relief. For example, the brutal reprisals in-
flicted on Attica inmates'2 ' after suppression of the rebellion evoked the
disapproval of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court
found the inmates' claims of "continuing cruel and inhuman physical
abuse'"" proper grounds for injunctive relief, since there was "danger of
recurrent violation.'"2
3
" See United States v. Jones, 108 F. Supp. 266, 270 (S.D. Fla. 1952), rev'd on other grounds,
207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953). Corporal punishment is banned from federal prisons by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3564 (1971).
11 State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 519 (Del. 1963). See United States v. Jones, 108 F. Supp.
266, 270 (S.D. Fla. 1952); State v. Revis, 193 N.C. 192, 136 S.E. 346, 348 (1927).
" 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
' 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
" See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 1971);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971) quoting AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL
AsSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 417 (3d ed. 1966). New disciplinary guide-
lines for New York correctional facilities provide:
[N]o officer or other employee of the department shall inflict any blows whatever
upon any inmate, unless in self defense, or to suppress a revolt or insurrection.
N.Y. CORR. LAW § 137(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972). Employees are permitted to use "all
suitable means to defend themselves, to maintain order, to enforce observation of discipline,
to secure the persons of the offenders to prevent any .. .attempt [to] escape." Id.
,2 There was evidence that for four days injured prisoners on stretchers were beaten with
sticks, belts, bats, and other weapons. Others were clubbed as they ran naked through gaunt-
lets of guards. In addition, guards harassed prisoners by dragging them on the ground, spit-
ting upon them, burning them with matches, poking at them with sticks, and using threaten-
ing and abusive language. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12,
18-19 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 20.
' Id. at 23. The court stressed that isolated occurrences of beatings would not constitute
grounds for injunctive relief. Furthermore, the court did not deny prison officials the right to
resort to physical force where necessary for the protection of one's self or others, prevention
of escape, or where serious injury to property is threatened. Id. at 23.
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In addition to physical force, tear gas is employed in prisons as a
method of controlling rebellious inmates.' Prison officials should not be
denied effective means of maintaining security and discipline, but arbi-
trary and abusive use of tear gas should be curtailed. 2 5 At least one court
has found that the use of tear gas to disable an individual inmate who
poses no serious physical threat is an impermissible form of corporal pun-
ishment.'26 As in the case of beatings, courts should apply the standard of
necessity in determining whether tear gas constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the circumstances.
B. Other Forms of Corporal Punishment
Whipping and beating are not the only forms of corporal punishment
being challenged in the federal courts today. The court in Gates v. Collier"7
found that officials at Mississippi's Parchman Prison had acquiesced in
the infliction of numerous bizarre physical abuses. Among those labelled
by the court as corporal punishment were administering milk of magnesia,
turning fans on inmates while they were naked and wet, shooting at in-
mates to keep them standing or moving, using a cattle prod to keep prison-
ers in line, and handcuffing inmates to the fences or cell bars for long
periods of time.'28 The court found these practices "excessive" and in viola-
tion of the eighth amendment. 29
Undoubtedly, few of the Parchman disciplinary measures are sanc-
tioned in other institutions. However, the practice of handcuffing prisoners
to cell bars, condemned by the Gates court, is not unique to the Mississippi
penal system. The cruelty of excessive handcuffing has been criticized by
courts in the past, 30 and recently, it was declared unconstitutional in
Landman v. Royster.'3' The court cited the American Correctional Associa-
12, See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 649 (E.D. Va. 1971).
"I Abusive tear gassing has been reduced in federal prisons by denying guards the right to
carry it on their person. See Hirschkop & Milleman, supra note 16, at 837.
1 Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 649 (E.D. Va. 1971).
127 349 F. Supp. 881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
Id. at 890, 900.
24 Id. at 895, 900. In order to safeguard against future abuses, the court ordered the prison
officials to submit for judicial approval rules and regulations setting forth: (1) all conduct
which constitutes a breach of discipline; (2) the penalties to be imposed for such conduct;
and (3) a statement of the procedures by which disciplinary decisions would be made. Id. at
899.
1: See, e.g., State v. Carpenter, 231 N.C. 229, 56 S.E.2d 713, 721 (1949) (prisoner handcuffed
to the bars of his cell and left hanging for 70 hours). Cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910) (chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrist); In re Birdsong, 399 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.
Ga. 1889) (prisoner chained by his neck to the cell bars).
':' 333 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1971). One of the plaintiffs was left with permanent scars as a
result of being fettered to his cell bars, and another, having been chained to his bars for five
days without leave to visit toilet facilities, endured prolonged physical pain. Id. at 638-39,
647.
19 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1973
tion's Manual of Correctional Standards, which condemns all types of
corporal punishment, including "handcuffing to cell doors or posts, [and]
shackling so as to enforce cramped position or to cut off circulation".'32
Although District Judge Merhige labelled handcuffing inhuman,1 3 3 he re-
lied primarily upon the necessity test in determining whether handcuffing
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The only justification for the
use of handcuffing in a cell is the prevention of self-injury or suicide."14
Even in these cases it would be necessary for the defendants to demon-
strate that no less harsh means could achieve the same end. The court had
no difficulty in suggesting two reasonable alternatives; straitjacketing or
some form of drug treatment.'
35
Just as excessive handcuffing has come to be classified as a cruel and
unusual form of corporal punishment, so, too, the constitutionality of the
bread and water diet has been questioned. Although the reduced diet has
been an institutional disciplinary device since time immemorial, 36 numer-
ous modern authorities recognize that dietary safeguards should be imple-
mented to maintain the prisoner's health.' 37 Landman v. Royster took a
bold step forward holding that the "bread and water diet is inconsistent
with current minimum standards of respect for human dignity.""'3 Judge
Merhige found that "the pains of hunger constitute a dull, prolonged sort
of corporal punishment"'39 and that the insufficient caloric content of the




Because the prison regulations required a supplemental meal every
third day, the Fifth Circuit refused to hold the bread and water diet to be
an objectionable aspect of solitary confinement in the Texas prison sys-
tem. 43 Relying on a Third Circuit decision in which the bread and water
"I AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 417 (3d ed.
1966), quoted in 333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971).
' 333 F. Supp. at 648.
' Solitary confinement would suffice for the prevention of escape or injuries to others.
333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (1971).
,3' See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 50.
'17 See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1971); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881, 900 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 716 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S.
413, 415 (1967) (per curiam) (daily fare of 12 ounces of thin soup and 8 ounces of water, in
combination with other factors, termed a "shocking display of barbarism").
333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. 1971).
Id. at 647.
"' There are only 700 calories in a daily portion of bread and water and the sedentary man
needs 2000 calories to maintain continued health. Id. at 647. See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881, 900 (N.D. Miss. 1972). Cf. Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 674 n.4A (5th Cir. 1971).
' 333 F. Supp. at 647.
2 Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1971).
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diet was upheld under like circumstances,' the court supported its argu-
ment by noting that the prison authorities generally restrained the use of
the diet to avoid damage to the prisoner's health. ' 4 In the dissenting opin-
ion, it was vigorously asserted that bread and water was "a starvation diet"
amounting to "physical punishment."' 45 The dissenting judge would have
required regular meals as a concomitant to solitary confinement. 14,
Federal prisoners in solitary confinement are not subjected to a bread
and water diet,'47 and the court in Landman v. Royster was encouraged by
the fact that its use is also infrequent in Virginia prisons.' The authorities
now stand divided on the minimum diet issue, but perhaps, considering
the focus of riot complaints, courts in the future will be willing to expand
the meaning of corporal punishment and condemn the bread and water
diet.
C. Solitary Confinement
Probably no other form of disciplinary punishment has generated as
much controversy in recent years as solitary confinement. Termed "puni-
tive" or "administrative" segregation'49 by prison officials, solitary confine-
ment has occupied the center stage of numerous federal cases. Although
in many instances, it takes on elements of physical punishment, enforced
isolation is primarily a psychological device intended to cure unruly in-
mates of undesirable behavior. Allegations of unconstitutionality have
been levelled against use of the isolated cell in situations where allegedly
excessive time and inadequate health safeguards are factors and in situa-
tions where virtually no controls whatsoever are present-the strip cells.'
50
In addition, frequent claims have been made that administrative rules
governing the imposition of solitary confinement are so lacking in proce-
dural fairness as to violate due process of law.'5' Those cases in which the
"I Ford v. Board of Managers, 407 F.2d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 1969) ("the temporary inconvenience
and discomforts incident [to solitary confinement] cannot be regarded as a basis for judicial
relief").
"I Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 674.
Id. at 687.
1,7 Id. at 685 n.11.
333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. 1971).
"Punitive" segregation is ordinarily used as a punishment device when less severe mea-
sures, such as reprimands or loss of privileges, have been ineffectual in controlling an inmate's
conduct. See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1971). "Administrative" segregation
is designed to protect the inmate either from self-injury or injury to others. See Graham v.
Willingham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (10th Cir. 1967).
"" Ordinarily defined by means of example, "strip cells" are usually small barren rooms
devoid of sinks, commodes, windows, lights, bedding, and toiletries and other hygienic mate-
rials. In many such cells, human wastes are deposited in a hole in the floor and can be flushed
only by a mechanism located outside the cell. See note 185 infra.
"' See, e.g., Colligan v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Biagiarelli v.
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punishment itself has been challenged as an abridgement of the eighth
amendment will be explored.
Ironically, the introduction of solitary confinement in America was the
result of a humanitarian reaction to corporal punishment.' 2 Inspired by
Quakers, the Walnut Street Penitentiary in Philadelphia, instituted in
1787, what was to be a humane alternative to physical punishment: crimi-
nals were to be placed in individual cells completely isolated from all
human society.'5 Enforced "meditation" would hopefully lead to reforma-
tion and penitence. Years later, the Supreme Court observed that the
Walnut Street experiment had produced less than ideal results:
[Elxperience demonstrated that there were serious objections to [solitary
confinement]. Considerable numbers of the prisoners fell, after even a
short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition from which it was next to
impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others, still,
committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally
reformed and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be
of any subsequent service to the community.' 54
It was apparent to the Supreme Court, as early as 1890, that a negative
relationship existed between solitary confinement and the psychological
well-being of the prisoner.' Nevertheless, nearly every penal institution
today includes isolation units for prisoners who become serious disciplinary
problems.'
Federal courts have stressed that solitary confinement per se is not a
cruel and unusual punishment.'7 The added burdens of a bread and water
Sielaff, 349 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
,12 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2-3; Kaufman, supra note 9, at 500 n.17.
'"'I Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). "[The prisoner] had no direct intercourse with
or sight of any human being, and no employment or instruction."
151 Id.
Id. Modern psychologists describe the experience of prolonged isolation as "sensory depri-
vation." 2 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1243-44 (1969). In laboratory experiments,
human subjects were placed in conditions approximating the more severe forms of solitary
confinement, and they reportedly experienced hallucinations and delusions similar to those
described in mescaline intoxication. Id. at 1244. See also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
190 (2d Cir. 1971).
,"I TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 50.
"7 See, e.g., Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967); Carlisle v.Bensinger, 355
F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1973). In Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd,
439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971), a prisoner was unsuccessful in challenging solitary confinement
as an arbitrary modification of life imprisonment into a harsher form of incarceration. The
court declared:
[Solitary confinement] is permissible where its object is protection of the general
prison population or the personnel, protection of the prisoner himself, for disobedience
of orders or for prevention of his escape.
309 F. Supp. at 500.
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diet and insufficient lighting did not persuade the court in Novak v. Beto58
to abandon this stance, nor did the fact of confinement in excess of one
year persuade the court in Sostre v. McGinnis5 ' that segregated confine-
ment was incompatible with contemporary standards of decency. This is
not to say, however, that these courts, and others, 6 ' have not been con-
cerned with limiting the conditions under which segregated confinement
may be imposed. The controversy centers on the extent of the limitations.
The Novak court refused to declare unconstitutional solitary confine-
ment as used by the Texas Department of Corrections (TDC) primarily
because the prison officials demonstrated that their "Disciplinary Proce-
dures" memorandum complied substantially with the rules of the Ameri-
can Correctional Association's Manual of Correctional Standards, con-
ceded to provide progressive standards.1 6 1 The court further relied on sta-
tistical data which showed that solitary confinement had a deterrent effect
on subsequent infractions, 62 that segregated confinement was used spar-
ingly by the TDC,'63 and finally, that the TDC was ranked high among the
nation's prisons for its reform-minded administration.'" The dissenting
judge felt that the majority's use of statistics belied the fact that TDC
isolation cells were still within the eighth amendment's reach. He found
particularly offensive the restrictive diet6 5 and the "pitch black cell"' 6
which produced "complete sensory deprivation."'67 Novak demonstrates
the variance of opinion concerning the number of deprivations constitu-
tionally permissible in solitary confinement.
In Sostre v. McGinnis,' the Second Circuit was presented with the
question of whether length of confinement should be considered in deter-
mining the cruelty of punitive segregation. The court held that under the
circumstances, it should not. 66 Plaintiff-Sostre's physical environment was
found acceptable. Therefore, the court found no need to limit the duration
of confinement to fifteen days, thereby overruling the district court's deci-
453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971).
159 442 F.2d 178, 190 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
"I See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 900 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621, 648-49 (E.D. Va. 1971).
'"' Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 666-70 (5th Cir. 1971). The cells at TDC were found to include
hygienic materials, flush toilets, blankets, lightweight clothing for the prisoners, and temper-
ature controls identical to those used throughout the penitentiary. Id. at 665-66. In addition,
a fifteen day confinement period was the norm. Id. at 668.
1"2 Id. at 669.
I Id.
"' Id. at 666.
'; See text accompanying notes 142-46 supra.
453 F.2d 661, 673 (5th Cir. 1971).
'1 See note 155 supra.
442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
442 F.2d at 192.
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sion.'7 0 Indeed, the appellate court refused to hold "that the Eighth
Amendment forbids indefinite confinement under the conditions endured
by Sostre. .... ""' The favorable conditions of Sostre's isolation included:
(1) adequate meals; (2) the availability of hygienic materials; (3) the op-
portunity for exercise and for participation in group therapy; and (4) provi-
sion of reading matter, including unlimited law books.'" The.Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Sostre will be an impediment to future holdings that
solitary confinement for prolonged periods, at least where other factors are
tolerable, violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause.'7 3
But no matter how the Second Circuit may ultimately view extended
ordinary solitary confinement, it is clear that its tolerance of confinement
in strip cells is severely limited, regardless of the time span involved. In
one of the first cases condemning strip cells,'14 the Second Circuit in 1967
reversed the dismissal of a complaint by an inmate of the Clinton State
Prison at Dannemora, New York.175 The court held that if the prisoner
could prove his allegations, ' the subhuman conditions he described in the
Dannemora strip cell "could only serve to destroy completely the spirit and
undermine the sanity of the prisoner.""'
Maintaining its original appraisal of strip cells, the Second Circuit in
'7 In Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court had imposed a fifteen
day maximum confinement, relying, in part, upon a psychiatrist's testimony that long-term
isolation might lead to distortions of reality and ultimate destruction of a person's mentality.
The court of appeals considered the psychiatric testimony and determined that the court was
without power to choose between competing theories of the psychological effects of prolonged
solitary confinement. 442 F.2d 178, 193 n.24 (2d Cir. 1971). Dissenting Judge Feinberg took
issue with the majority's failure to accept the lower court's "finding of fact" that the open-
ended nature of Sostre's confinement threatened the prisoner's sanity. Id. at 207, 209.
"7 442 F.2d at 193 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 193-94.
'7 But see United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3d Cir. 1973). For a
detailed discussion of both the eighth amendment question and other issues raised in Sostre,
see Second Circuit Note, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 474 (1972).
"7 In 1966, a district court had held that irregularly cleaned cells, lack of hygienic materials,
a mere hole in the floor for receiving bodily wastes, and the absence of a flushing mechanism
amounted to a condition "that inevitably does violence to elemental concepts of decency."
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966). To emphasize the horror of what
he had seen, the judge appended photographs to his opinion, illustrating the strip cells in use
at the Soledad penitentiary.
"7 Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
' The inmate-plaintiff was allegedly stripped of all clothing and confined for several days
in a cell which was "dirty, filthy and unsanitary, without adequate heat and virtually barren;
the toilet and sink were encrusted with slime, dirt and human excremental residue." Id. at
521. Wright was also denied the use of soap, towel, toilet paper, toothbrush, comb and other
hygienic implements. Because of inadequate heating, he was exposed to sub-freezing temper-
atures. Id.
" Id. at 526. On remand, Wright successfully proved that the allegations of his complaint
were true. Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), afj'd, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972) (awarding compensatory damages).
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LaReau v. MacDougall7 1 condemned their use at the Connecticut Correc-
tional Institution at Somers, Connecticut. For possession of "contra-
band"' LaReau was incarcerated for five days in a barren cell without
windows. The only light was from a 100 watt bulb which shone through a
hole at the rear of the cell. It was turned on for LaReau only at meal times
and the few occasions when he was allowed to read. In addition, the walls
and door did not permit the transmission of sound, so the prisoner was
frequently in total darkness and total silence. The cell contained no sink
or commode, although there was a "chinese toilet," described by the court
as "merely a hole in the floor in the corner of the cell covered with a grate.
It was flushed with water by a manually-controlled valve operated from
outside the cell."'"" There was no opportunity for exercise and the prisoner
was forbidden from talking or communicating with anyone in the outside
world, except that he was permitted to write. Finding that these conditions
"seriously threatened the physical and mental soundness" of the occu-
pant,"'1 the court applied the guidelines suggested by Wright v. McMann s2
and Sostre v. McGinnis13 and held that the Somers strip cell "fall[s]
below the irreducible minimum of decency required by the Eighth Amend-
ment.""s4
Besides expanding the number of recent cases condemning strip
cells,' 15 LaReau is a significant decision in other respects. First, it suggests
17- 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
'7' The contraband was a rope made from towels, which LaReau, a prior escapee, might have
used as a weapon or as an instrument of escape. Id. at 982.
110 Id. at 977.
- Id. at 978.
W2 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
" 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972). The lower court had actually
visited the cells but found that "when properly used for limited periods according to the
existing rules," they did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. LaReau v. MacDou-
gall, 354 F. Supp. 1133, 1141 (D. Conn. 1971).
'm The conditions reported in other strip cells are all variations on a theme, the common motif
being lack of hygienic materials and sanitation facilities. See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Williams v. Wainwright, 350 F. Supp. 33, 34 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 720 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff 'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Knuckles
v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1970); Hancock v.
Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). See also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
Ark. 1970) (objectionable conditions found to be partly the result of inmate conduct).
A few courts in the late sixties adhered to the hands-off doctrine and refused to condemn
strip cells. See Ford v. Board of Managers, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969); Loux v. Rhay, 375
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1967); Roberts v. Papersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 877 (1967).
In 1967, the Supreme Court had a glimpse of a "sweatbox." Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S.
413 (1967) (per curiam). A prisoner accused of participating in a riot confessed to the alleged
infraction after being confined for two weeks in a windowless, "barren cage fitted only with a
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that the physical conditions set forth in Sostre could become the minimal
standards' 6 for all degrees of solitary confinement. This possibility trou-
bled the dissenting judge, who stressed that the Sostre standards were
never meant to apply to strip cells, i.e., that prison authorities should have
the option of imposing more severe conditions than those mentioned in
Sostre when they are dealing with particularly troublesome inmates., 7 By
holding the strip cell unconstitutional per se, however, the majority af-
firmed the proposition that even punishment for serious offenses cannot be
allowed to transgress "the human dignity of inmates."'8 8 Secondly, the
LaReau majority took judicial notice that placing a prisoner in a cell which
is almost continuously dark would threaten his sanity and sever his con-
tacts with reality.'88 The court's concern for the inmate's mental health is
an important development in judicial review of prison conditions.' 0 Fi-
nally, by way of dictum, the court stated that although enforced isolation
and boredom are permissible methods of discipline, "they might not re-
main so if extended over a long period of time.""' Thus, the court indicated
that the Sostre decision, upholding prolonged and indefinite isolation, may
be weakening in precedential value. The ultimate rule of the case is that
regardless of the length of the confinement or the seriousness of the offense,
the strip cell is cruel and unusual punishment per se.
D. Revocation of Good Time Credit
In contrast with the previously discussed punishments, the device of
withholding or revoking "good time" credit has virtues which only reckless
abuse can diminish. Almost all correctional facilities utilize this
statutorily-provided method of enforcing prison rules."' By maintaining
orderly conduct, i.e., accumulating good time credit, prisoners are able to
reduce the length of their confinement.'93 Non-conforming behavior leads
to revocation or forfeiture of credit in the discretion of the prison official
hole in one corner into which he and his cell mates could defecate." Id. at 414. The Court
held that the fourteen days spent in the "oppressive hole" tainted any notions that his
confession was voluntary:
The record in this case documents a shocking display of barbarism which should not
escape the remedial action of this Court.
Id. at 415.
See LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 n.7 (2d Cir. 1972).
'I Id. at 980-81 & n.7.
,' Id. at 978. As an alternative holding, the court found that confining LaReau to the strip
cell was a "grossly severe penalty" for possession of contraband. Id. at 978 n.6.
Id. at 978.
UO See text accompanying notes 280-90 infra.
473 F.2d at 978.
"z TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 50.
", See, e.g., N.Y. CORR. LAW § 803(1) (McKinney 1968).
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or board empowered to make such decisions. '94 Withholding credit clearly
is not cruel and unusual punishment under a "shock the conscience" test,
but courts, in isolated cases, have condemned denials of good time that are
disproportionate to the offense'95 or made without due process of law.' 6
The good time credit system has distinct advantages over other disci-
plinary devices because it functions on a reward basis motivating in a
positive way conformity with prison rules. It has been suggested' that
more incentive schemes would help eradicate charges that the taint of
sadism and vengeance degrades all prison disciplinary methods.
Protecting the Prisoner's Health and Welfare
Findings of cruel and unusual punishment in the prisons have ex-
tended far beyond various disciplinary devices. Courts have expanded the
meaning of the eighth amendment to embrace such guarantees as proper
medical facilities and services. Most recently, entire penal systems have
been scrutinized for their damaging cumulative effects on prisoners.
A. Medical Services
Upon delivery into the hands of his keepers, the prisoner forfeits all
rights to choose his own doctor or the facilities where he will receive medi-
cal treatment. Because prison authorities exercise exclusive control over
the prisoner's health,'98 they have been charged with a duty to provide
needed medical care.'99 Only recently, however, has the adequacy of this
treatment been subjected to review under the eighth amendment.
As in other areas of administrative responsibility, prison officials have
been afforded wide discretion in determining the medical needs of prison-
ers.'20 The view that only "exceptional circumstances" will justify a court's
intervention2'" is changing. Charges that medical deprivations amount to
unconstitutional treatment2 2 have been subjected to varying applications
' See, e.g., id. § 803(3)-(4). See United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.
1965); Carlisle v. Bensinger, 355 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Prison officials have
been criticized for viewing good time credits as privileges rather than rights. See, e.g., Hirsch-
kop & Millemann, supra note 16, at 831-32.
", See, e.g., Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
g, See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971); Bundy v. Cannon,
328 F. Supp. 165, 173 (D. Md. 1971).
"7 See TASK FORCE REPoRTS, supra note 8, at 50-51.
Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
1'9 Id.; Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir. 1966). See generally Sneidman,
Prisoners and Medical Treatment: Their Rights and Remedies, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 450 (1968).
m See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963); Newman v.
Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 280 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
1' Oaks v. Wainwright, 430 F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1970).
20 Courts do not always make it clear which provision of the Constitution is applicable. See
Decency and Fairness, supra note 26, at 861. But see Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278,
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of conventional tort theory-negligence, gross negligence, and intent being
the'guiding standards.2°3 Recovery has been granted most often where the-
prisoner has shown an intentional deprivation of medical care." 4 Under
this standard, the complainant must demonstrate that prison officials
have deliberately denied him access to medical treatment. Examples of
such intentional conduct include compelling a prisoner to perform hard
labor when it is known that he is ill, s and refusing to administer an
officially prescribed diet."0 6 On occasion, courts have been willing to con-
sider gross negligence as an equivalent of intentional conduct. °7 The influ-
ential Second Circuit, while originally holding that in the absence of intent
severe and obvious injuries must be present, °8 has modified its stance to
include "deliberate indifference" within the purview of the eighth amend-
ment. In Corby v. Conboy,09 the prisoner had brought a serious nasal
problem to the attention of the authorities, but no remedial action was
taken. In reversing the dismissal of the complaint, the Court of Appeals
relied upon an earlier case2 10 in which the "deliberate indifference" and
"gross misconduct" of prison authorities' debased their conduct below the
level of mere negligence. "
Understandably, courts have been reluctant to treat medical negli-
gence in the prisons as a constitutional deprivation. 1 2 Both prison officials
and doctors are frequently confronted by feigned illnesses,' and it is often
280 (M.D. Ala. 1972): "The adequacy of medical treatment provided prison inmates is a
condition subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny."
2'0 The analysis along negligence lines was enunciated in an addendum to the decision in
Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970). The Ninth Circuit has fashioned
a different approach. To bring his case within constitutional proportions, the prisoner must
allege and prove: (1) an acute physical condition; (2) an urgent need for medical care; (3)
the refusal or failure of officials to provide treatment; and (4) tangible residual injury. May-
field v. Craven, 299 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 433 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1970).
"I Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124, 128
(N.D. Ill. 1963).
20 Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 687
(E.D. Ark. 1965).
26 Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966).
207 Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
20 Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1969). The complaint alleged that prison
authorities knew, or "should have known," that the prisoner's health was failing. As a result
of the alleged inaction, the prisoner died. The court held that the complaint described little
more than negligence.
209 457 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972).
210 Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970).
211 The prisoner's complaint stated that in defiance of a surgeon's instructions and without
obtaining a discharge, officials prematurely removed him from the hospital after he had
undergone a serious leg operation. Id. at 924.
212 Id.
2 See United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 868 (2d Cir. 1970); Ramsey v.
Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
"I See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 901 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
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impossible for them to know whether actual care is required or the prisoner
is merely malingering. In such instances, deference to administrative judg-
ments would be proper."' On the other hand, it has been found that prison-
ers may be discouraged from bringing medical problems to the attention
of the authorities, fearing a reprisal if nothing serious is discovered."'
Nevertheless, negligence claims arising from improper medical treatment
in the prisons are better left to conventional tort remedies."
Although the case-by-case approach described above results in com-
pensation for injured individuals and possibly an increased vigilance on
the part of prison medical authorities, it fails to insure that adequate
medical treatment will be administered to other prisoners in the future.
Through recent class actions, however, prisoners have been able to secure
improved medical care and facilities throughout an entire penal system.
In Gates v. Collier,21 the court found that the inefficient and inadequate
medical staff and facilities at the Mississippi State Penitentiary threat-
ened the physical health and safety of the inmates, thereby constituting
cruel and unusual punishment.219 The defendant-administrators were
commanded to meet minimal health care requirements by (1) employing
additional medical personnel, (2) forbidding untrained inmates to serve as
staff assistants, and (3) taking the necessary steps to bring the prison
hospital and equipment into compliance with state licensing requirements
for hospitals and infirmaries. 20 As a standard by which to measure the
adequacy of medical services, the court ordered the defendants to use their
"best efforts" to comply with the guidelines of the American Correctional
Association.=2
When presented with a class action on behalf of the four thousand
prisoners of the Alabama Penal System the court in Newman v. Ala bama'2
reached a conclusion similar to that in Gates. The Newman court declared
that the failure of the Board of Corrections to provide sufficient medical
facilities, staff, and services was a "willful and intentional violation" of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. 2 3 In addition, it was held that "the
362, 380 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
215 See Decency and Fairness, supra note 26, at 862.
2" Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 888 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
2 It has been suggested, however, that since prisoners have no choice in the matter of
medical treatment, the authorities should be charged with a higher duty of care when negli-
gence actions are brought against them. See Plotkin, Enforcing Prisoners' Rights to Medical
Treatment, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 159, 165 (1973).
211 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
"I Id. at 894. The court found that the inadequate medical care, along with insufficient
housing and improper diets, was not only "unnecessarily cruel and unusual" but also a threat
to the process of rehabilitation. Id.
22" See text accompanying notes 295-96 infra.
221 Id.
22 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
12 Id. at 285-86.
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intentional refusal by correctional officers to allow inmates access to medi-
cal personnel and to provide prescribed medicines" was cruel and unusual
punishment. 224 The Newman court was more explicit than the Gates court
in specifying the relief measures to be taken.2 5 The Alabama Board of
Corrections was ordered, inter alia,(1) to meet the standards provided in
the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare Proposed
Revised Regulations for Participation of Hospitals in the Medicare
Program, (2) to comply with the regulations of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the dispensation of medicine, and (3)
to provide for periodic inspections by the Alabama State Board of
Health.2
2 6
The Newman and Gates assaults on inadequate medical treatment are
signposts pointing the way to better health protection 2 1 for inmates. Both
decisions make it clear that an inadequacy of staff and facilities is suffi-
cient in itself to constitute a violation of the eighth amendment. Probably
few states have been as remiss in providing medical care for inmates as
have been Mississippi and Alabama. But even in Ohio25 and Pennsyl-
vania2 29 municipal jails were recently chastised for providing little if any
medical care. Individual prisoners still can and should seek compensatory
relief where official misconduct results in a denial of proper medical atten-
tion. But where widespread inadequacies exist, the Newman and Gates
models should be employed.
B. Cumulative Effects of the Prison Environment: A New Approach
An important new development which contains the potential for
prison reform on a widespread basis was announced in Holt v. Sarver20
which held:
[Clonfinement itself within a given instituton may amount to a cruel and
unusual punishment . . . where the confinement is characterized by condi-
tions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably
civilized people ... 
224 Id. at 286.
225 In its injunction, the court issued a total of 25 directives to be followed in bringing a new
medical program to Alabama prisons. Further, the court required submission of a report
within six months of its decree, detailing the implementation of each item. Id. at 286-88.
"6 Id. at 286-87.
2 The health of inmates has also caused concern to courts faced with conditions of solitary
confinement. In Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971), for example,
the court made certain that nudity in solitary be permitted only when a doctor states in
writing that the inmate's health will not be adversely affected. Id.
22 Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
12 Jackson v. Hendrick, 40 U.S.L.W. 2710 (Ct. C. P., April 7, 1972).
210 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
21 Id. at 372-73.
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Because of the cumulative effects of the infamous trusty system, uncon-
trolled abuses in barracks life, bad conditions in isolation cells, lack of a
rehabilitation program and general inadequacy of medical facilities, the
court declared confinement in the Arkansas Penitentiary System unconsti-
tutional.232
Two years later, Gates v. Collier23 found, in like manner, that the
Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman was being "maintained and
operated in a manner violative of rights secured to inmates by the United
States Constitution. 2 3 The court discovered an aggregate of conditions,
including racial segregation,2 5 inadequate building facilities, poor medical
services, insufficient protection of inmates from fellow prisoners, an abu-
sive trusty system, and cruel disciplinary procedures, all of which the court
found to be grounds for declaratory and injunctive relief for the inmates. 36
When Holt v. Sarver137 was handed down, many observers believed
that since the Arkansas penal system was unusually barbaric, there would
be few decisions like Holt in the future.2 38 Gates v. Collier makes it clear
that the Holt approach is not an anomaly and that it is still viable as a
means of achieving the widespread reform that is so desperately needed in
many penal systems. Both courts were particularly concerned with the
general safety and well-being of the prisoner. In safeguarding the prisoner's
physical and mental welfare, Holt and Gates condemned the overall envi-
ronment to which the prisoner was exposed.
In addition to the inadequate medical services and facilities,29 Gates
assailed three aspects of the prisoners' environment at Parchman: the
physical facilities, 4 0 the barracks life, and the trusty system.
1. Physical Facilities-After examining the evidence, the court was con-
vinced that the housing units at Parchman were "unfit for human habita-
tion under any modern concept of decency. 2 4' Water and sewage lines
presented immediate health hazards, electrical and heating units were in
total disrepair, bathrooms were unsanitary, and emergency fire-fighting
equipment was inadequate. 22 The prison authorities were enjoined to take
232 Id. at 381.
13 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
14 Id. at 893.
23 Because of the Parchman policy of racial segregation, the United States intervened on
behalf of the plaintiff. Id. at 885.
,w Id.
237 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
m See 84 HARV. L. Rlv. 456 (1970).
3' See text accompanying notes 218-21 supra.
20 The court in Holt v. Sarver did not find it necessary to condemn the physical aspects of
the housing units.
21 Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 887 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
2 Id. at 887-88.
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immediate steps to install new equipment and facilities.',
2. Life in the Barracks-Protection of inmates from assaults and other
abuses by their fellows is a duty which often goes unfulfilled by prison
administrators.244 The Gates court learned that authorities at Parchman
had been particularly delinquent in providing such protection. All inmates
were placed in one large dormitory-style room without any classification
or assignment procedure, the result being the intermingling of violent
criminals and persons convicted for nonviolent crimes. Since the number
of civilian guards was totally inadequate, many custodial duties were as-
signed to incompetent and untrained inmates. When the lights went out
at night, violent assaults,4 5 including stabbings, were uncontrollable. 26
Such inadequate protection, the court held, was cruel and unusual punish-
ment.24 7 To reduce the risks of inmate abuses in the future, the court
commanded the penitentiary officials to eliminate overcrowding, institute
methods to detect weapons among the prisoners, relieve inmates of cus-
todial duties and replace them with competent civilian personnel, and
make reasonable efforts to isolate prisoners with records of assaults and
violence against other inmates. 24 8
3. The Trusty System-At the time Holt v. Sarver249 was decided, the
peculiar trusty system, "universally condemned by penologists, '2 50 was
utilized only in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. "Trusties" are pris-
oners assigned the job of guarding other inmates. They are armed with
guns in the fields, and are often left in full control of other prisoners, thus
having as was recognized in Holt, "the power of life and death over other
inmates. ' ' 251 At Parchman, it was found that many of the trusties had been
convicted of violent crimes and a majority were psychologically dis-
243 Id. at 894.
2 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (per curiam).
245 The Government has the absolute right to hold prisoners for offenses against it but
it also has the correlative duty to protect them against assault or injury from any
quarter while so held.
The Gates decision makes no reference to the homosexual assaults prevalent in many prisons
today. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 377 (E.D. Ark. 1970). The Holt court was
appalled by the lack of precautions taken against such abuses in Arkansas. Id. at 377.
2' 349 F. Supp. at 889.
Id. at 894.
24 Id. at 902.
211 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
250 Id.
254 Id. at 374. Penologists disapprove of the system because:
[Ilt creates an unhealthy prison climate and atmosphere; it breeds fear and hatred
between the guards, on the one hand, and those guarded, on the other hand; it tends
to be brutal and to endanger the lives of inmates who live and work "under the guns"
of other convicts ....
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turbed . 52 Besides inflicting economic injury upon fellow inmates through
extortion, they were guilty of having wounded a number of prisoners and
physically beaten others. The unchecked authority which trusties exer-
cised over other prisoners was held "patently impermissible,"' 3 and the
defendants were ordered to immediately commence phasing out the trust-
ies and replacing them with civilian guards. The court insisted that lack
of funds "shall not constitute valid grounds for continuing delay. ' '25,
Although the trusty system is a southern anomaly, many of the other
adverse conditions uncovered in Arkansas and Mississippi prisons have
been discovered in northern institutions. 255 Indeed, the Holt-Gates model
of overall prison condemnation had been employed against a United States
jail in Anchorage, Alaska in 1951.256 Although the court was unable to
propose a remedy, it found the ancient frame building, overcrowding, in-
termingling of youths with hardened criminals, lack of adequate sanitary
facilities, and general dilapidation "inexcusable and shocking to the sensi-
bilities of all civilized persons. '257 More recently, a federal district court
in Ohio examined "the total picture of confinement in the Lucas County
Jail" 5s and ordered extensive changes in the personnel and physical envi-
ronment of the jail in order that the eighth amendment rights of its occu-
pants would be better protected. 259
These cases may have been influenced by what the Supreme Court in
Trop v. Dulles2 1 found objectionable about the punishment of expatria-
tion; the individual is subjected to a "fate of ever increasing fear and
distress. '261 It matters not, said the Trop Court, that actual consequences
ensue, because the "threat makes the punishment obnoxious. 2 2 In Holt,
the court observed that a convict in Arkansas "has no assurance whatever
252 Id. at 373. See generally 84 HARV. L. REv. 456 (1970).
35% had not been psychologically tested, 40% of those tested were found to be retarded,
and 71% of those tested were found to have personality disorders.
349 F. Supp. at 889.
55 Id. at 894.
254 Id. at 903.
'5 See Burger, supra note 1, at 168-69.
z5 Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alas. 1951). The district court judge found himself
in agreement with the comment of representatives of the health service of the federal govern-
ment that confinement in the jail was a "fabulous obscenity." Id. at 287.
257 Id. at 290.
z Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
259 Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub non. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). In an unofficially reported case, a Philadelphia court recently
declared that the conditions in Philadelphia municipal prisons were an invasion of the guar-
antees against cruel and unusual punishment. Jackson v. Hendrick, 40 U.S.L.W. 2710 (Ct.
C. P., April 7, 1972).
29 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Id. at 102.
262 Id.
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that he will not be killed, seriously injured, or sexually abused,"26 3 and the
Gates court was concerned with the "inherent risks" in the overcrowded
barracks and trusty system.2"4 Whether a prisoner is actually assaulted
should make little or no difference if the environment to which he is ex-
posed placed him in imminent danger of harm. Further, if the surrounding
facilities do not comport with standards of decency, then the authorities
responsible for maintenance must be held accountable. In the aggregate,
such conditions are detrimental to "the dignity of man"2 5 and are violative
of the eighth amendment.
Developing Trends in Judicial Review of Prisoners' Grievances
There is every indication from the burgeoning number of precedent-
setting cases that the hands-off doctrine is destined to be buried "in the
dustbin of legal history. '266 Courts are opening their eyes wide to the abhor-
rent conditions existing in penal institutions across the nation. Whether
or not they grant relief in all cases, courts are giving serious consideration
to the problems and are not merely brushing aside prisoners' claims as
being beyond the judicial province. This willingness to intervene, of course,
presents the practical problem once thought to be a justification for the
hands-off doctrine, namely the threat of an overburdened court calendar.
Some have suggested the use of non-judicial ombudsmen267 or arbitrators268
to hear prisoners' grievances, thereby avoiding the necessity for judicial
intervention. Chief Justice Burger269 and others"0 have recommended a
type of collective bargaining between authorities and inmates. Such proce-
dures would also serve to eliminate frivolous claims.
Accompanying the abrogation of the hands-off doctrine has been re-
laxation of the standards of "decency" required to "shock the conscience"
of the court. While deficiencies in the medical facilities of the Alabama
211 309 F. Supp. at 381. The frequency of assaults in the barracks "put some inmates in such
fear that it [was] not unusual for them to come to the front of the barracks and cling to the
bars all night." Id. at 377.
211 Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 888 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
[Clonfinement of inmates at Parchman in barracks unfit for human habitation and
in conditions that threaten their physical health and safety ... is impermissible.
Id. at 894.
265 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
26 Kaufman, supra note 9, at 506.
267 See id. at 511; Singer, Prisoners as Wards of the Court-A Nonconstitutional Path to
Assure Correctional Reform by the Courts, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 769 (1972); TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 85.
26I See Decency and Fairness, supra note 26, at 882-83.
266 Burger, supra note 1, at 170.
270 Singer & Keating, The Courts and the Prisoners: A Crisis of Confrontation, 9 CRIM. L.
BULL. 337 (1973). In an appendix the authors present a model for inmate-administration
grievance procedures. Id. at 349-57.
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prisons were not considered to "rise to constitutional proportions" in
1971,271 a year later, another court condemned them in their totality. 72 The
court that decided LaReau v. MacDougall13 banned the use of strip cells
under any circumstances and implied that all solitary confinement must
meet certain minimal standards to protect the health and sanity of isolated
prisoners.
An increasing reliance on the use of outside sources may help explain
the ability of the judiciary to recognize sub-minimal conditions. By looking
to the standards set forth by such organizations as the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 2 74 the American Correctional Association,2 5 the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare,26 and ad hoc investigating committee,2 77
courts have been able to combat the criticism that they lack penological
expertise. In some cases, judges have ordered prison officials either to meet
the standards provided by these outside sources or to submit for the court's
approval their own list of reforms following substantially the guidelines set
by other authorities.2 78 Furthermore, courts are retaining jurisdiction over
the prisons until the guidelines are satisfactorily met. 79
Courts are showing a greater reluctance to allow financial considera-
tions to impede the elimination of unconstitutional conditions.2 10 Ob-
viously, both the renovation of facilities and the hiring of better-trained
and larger staffs require large expenditures of public funds. But judicial
warnings that certain prisons will be shut down 281 need not trouble state
administrators if they follow the example of Mississippi. When Chief
Judge Keady declared Parchman unfit for habitation and ordered an ex-
tensive overhall in physical plant and personnel,2 2 the state authorities
took advantage of the newly-created federal funding program for state
271 Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196, 202 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
272 Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
273 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
271 See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967).
27 See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 647-48 (E.D. Va. 1971).
271 See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 286 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
27 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 892 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg,
323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
" See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Newman v. Alabama, 349
F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
211 See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D.
Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
2m See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968); Gates v. Collier, 349 F.
Supp. 881, 897 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
211 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. Ark. 1970). See generally Note,
Courts, Corrections, and the Eighth Amendment: Encouraging Prison Reform by Releasing
Inmates, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 1060, 1080-91 (1971).
212 See text accompanying notes 243, 248 & 254 supra.
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correctional facilities created by the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970.53
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA),114 under the
auspices of the Department of Justice, reviewed the conditions at Parch-
man and assured the authorities that upon prompt application by the
state, one million dollars in federal funds would be available for immediate
amelioration of Parchman's adverse conditions.25 It is to be hoped that
other states will take advantage of federal aid before they are forced into
action by the courts.
The recent cases reveal a growing concern with the health, both physi-
cal and mental, of incarcerated individuals. Whether this concern centers
around medical services and facilities or general deprivations endured in
solitary confinement, courts are no longer willing to give penal officers
unbridled discretion where a prisoner's health may be seriously jeopard-
ized. 216 Although psychiatric evidence was given little weight by the Second
Circuit in Sostre v. McGinnis, '2  a year later, the majority in LaReau v.
'- 42 U.S.C. §§ 3750-3750(d) (Supp. 1973). As the following pertinent excerpts from the
statute reveal, federal funds are conditioned upon assurances from the states that correctional
facilities will be brought into conformity with the most advanced standards of construction,
personnel, and rehabilitation programs.
The Administration [LEAA] is authorized to make a grant under this subchapter to
a State planning agency if the application incorporated in the comprehensive State
plan-
(1) sets forth a comprehensive statewide program for the construction, acquisition, or
renovation of correctional institutions and facilities in the State and the improvement
of correctional programs and practices throughout the State;
(4) provides satisfactory emphasis on the development and operation of community-
based correctional facilities and programs, including diagnostic services, halfway
houses, probation, and other supervisory release programs for pre-adjudication and
post-adjudication referral of delinquents, youthful offenders, and first offenders, and
community-oriented programs for the supervision of parolees;
(5) provides for advanced techniques in the design of institutions and facilities;
(6) provides, where feasible and desirable, for the sharing of correctional institutions
and facilities on a regional basis;
(7) provides satisfactory assurances that the personnel standards and programs of the
institutions and facilities will reflect advanced practices;
(8) provides satisfactory assurances that the State is engaging in projects and programs
to improve the recruiting, organization, training, and education of personnel employed
in correctional activities, including those of probation, parole, and rehabilitation.
' 42 U.S.C. § 3750(b)(1), (4)-(8) (Supp. 1973). 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (1970).
28 Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 892 (N.D. Miss. 1972). One million dollars, of course,
will not satisfy long-range reform. In Oklahoma, for example, the state legislature appropri-
ated $10 million to maintain the penal system in 1973. In commenting on recent rioting at
the prison, a gubernatorial assistant stated that even these funds were insufficient, adding:
In Oklahoma, as in most states, we do not spend enough money on our penal systems.
N.Y. Times, July 30, 1973, at 13, col. 4.
Compare Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) with Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971).
211 442 F.2d 178, 193 n.24 (2d Cir. 1971).
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MacDougal2 8 took judicial notice of the adverse psychological effects of
strip cells. Just as the Supreme Court was willing in Brown v. Board of
Education"9 to give serious consideration to the detrimental psychological
and sociological ramifications of racially segregated education, so too,
should federal courts give attention to the findings of psychologists con-
cerning the adverse affects of isolated confinement in the prisons.9
One of the guiding principles of the "new penology" is that criminals
"are sent to prison as punishment, rather than for punishment."' ' Reha-
bilitation of prisoners, an important aspect of the modern penology, is not
the sole function of imprisonment,29 2 but it is being recognized as one of
the most effective means of curbing recidivism.2 92 The lack of a rehabilita-
tion program in a prison is not per se unconstitutional. 294 But it was recog-
nized in Holt v. Sarver295 that a total indifference by prison authorities
towards rehabilitating prisioners may be an aggravating factor in making
confinement itself a cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore,
disciplinary punishments and general living conditions which have the
effect of retarding or interfering with the process of rehabilitation are being
carefully scrutinized under the eighth amendment.2 9
The most important result, perhaps, of active judicial review of prison
abuses is the public awareness generated. In forcing administrators and
legislators into action, courts are bringing to the public's attention the
neglect in prisons which is affirmatively linked to crime on the streets and
to violent prison outbreaks. 297 Surely, judicial activism, in spite of its inher-
ent shortcomings, is preferable to the prisoner activism that results in
bloodbaths such as Attica. 28
2- 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972).
2- 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 16, at 837.
290 See note 155 supra.
291 Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1970).
2'2 See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 16.
2" See generally Burger, supra note 1; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
294 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
295 Id.
21' See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
2'97 See generally Kaufman, supra note 9, at 510-15; Decency and Fairness, supra note 26, at
842-44.
219 An inmate in the Oklahoma state prison at McAlester told newsmen that
[w]ith overcrowding, poorly prepared food, a 'sadistic' medical system and no rehabil-
itation program, this [the riot] just had to happen.
N.Y. Times, July 29, 1973, at 36, col. 5 (city ed.).
